The Formative Era of American Law (1938) , the 'history of a system of law is largely a history of borrowings of legal materials from other legal systems and of assimilation of materials from outside of the law.' 2 The development of the English common law, the Roman-Canonic jus commune, and the advent of constitutionalism in the second half of the twentieth century are examples of phenomena in which the circulation of legal norms and ideas changed not only legal systems but also the course of history.
The study of legal transplants in comparative law aims to understand how the complex dynamic of cross-jurisdictional legal transfers brings legal systems into contact and eventually causes them to change. 3 For most of the twentieth century, comparative legal studies focused almost exclusively on rules of private law. Constitutional norms, and public law generally, 4 were perceived as too enmeshed with politics to allow for the same rigorous and systematic treatment that could be applied to the study of contract or property law.
And yet, instances of constitutional borrowing are now everywhere. Not only has the idea of a (written) constitution spread to virtually every corner of the world but also constitutions are gaining recognition as enforceable legal documents, rather than mere declarations. The At one level, this should not necessarily cause concern. The transplants debate in comparative private law became deadlocked in a polarized contest between scholars arguing that transplants can be found everywhere and other scholars who proclaimed legal transplants impossible because law is embedded in culture and cultures cannot be transplanted. That debate obscured as much as it illuminated the relationship between law and its broader cultural environment. Moreover, as we will see, the field of comparative constitutional law is already developing on its own rich ways of conceptualizing the interplay between (constitutional) law and (constitutional) culture.
Nevertheless, comparative constitutional law is comparative law. And comparative legal studies have much to offer, at both conceptual and normative levels, for thinking about legal borrowing in general. Understanding the many dangers associated with borrowing in the constitutional context-dangers involving misunderstanding, exclusion, or limitations of selfgovernment and democratic experimentalism-is enhanced by recourse to the traditions and formative debates of comparative law. Perhaps more than anything else, such recourse can help to infuse the field of comparative constitutional law with a much-tested comparative sensibility-that 'usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity'.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section II discusses terminology. The choice of metaphors is central to comparative private and constitutional law and should be the starting point for an overview of the topic. Section III introduces the transplants debate in comparative private law and discusses the distinction between private and public, specifically constitutional, law. Section IV is a prolegomena to an anatomy of constitutional transplants that draws, whenever possible, on the resources of comparative private law. It includes an analysis of the object of constitutional transplants, their timing, motivations, and patterns. The justification of constitutional patterns is discussed in Section V, in the context of the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication as a specific form of constitutional borrowing. The chapter concludes with a brief meditation on the topic of constitutional convergence.
II. Terminology: The Battle of Metaphors
A survey of the literature reveals great concern about the choice of metaphors to capture crossconstitutional interactions. 9 Available options include 'transplants', 'diffusion', 'borrowing', 'circulation', 'cross-fertilization', 'migration', 'engagement', 'influence', 'transmission', 'transfer', and 'reception'. Four of these metaphors have had greater staying power: 'transplants'
and its 'borrowing' equivalent in comparative constitutional law; 'circulation' and its 'migration' equivalent in comparative constitutional law. Alan Watson's Legal Transplants (1974) brought this concept to the center of comparative legal studies. 10 A scholar of legal history, Watson's study of the English common law and of the reception of Roman law in continental Europe led him to conclude that foreign transplants are the main mechanism by which private law evolves. Because legal rules are largely autonomous from the larger social and cultural surroundings, their transplant across jurisdictions is 'socially easy'. 11 Comparative law properly so called should therefore study the interaction between legal systems through the mechanism of legal transplants.
As we will see in the next section, the mechanistic overtones of 'transplants' have not traveled well to comparative constitutional law. 'Borrowing' is the analogous metaphor used to capture the phenomena of constitutional transplants. The inaugural symposium of the premier peer-review journal in the field, the International Journal of Constitutional Law, was dedicated to constitutional borrowing. 12 However, critics have argued that 'borrowing' is a deceiving metaphor. Leading the charge, Kim Lane Scheppele has pointed out that borrowing signifies a voluntary exchange among equals whereby the borrowed good will be returned unmodified, after a determined period, to the lender who remains its owner. That description does not apply to constitutional transfers. Unlike consumer goods, constitutional norms are not owned by particular legal system. They can be modified in the process of transfer and are not to be between. So a deeper shift is at work here, and it has to do with the comparative agenda itself.
The exclusive focus on borrowing, just like a focus on transplants, is primarily concerned with the mechanics of constitutional transfer and the interaction among constitutional systems. By contrast, non-borrowing reveals as much about a given constitutional order as it does about the dynamic between systems. The shift from borrowing to migration, or circulation, takes some of the emphasis away from the interaction itself and toward the deeper causes that lead systems to interact or to refuse interaction. As one author put it, interaction becomes an 'interpretative foil' 22 for exposing a constitutional system's deeper normative structures.
Nevertheless, the significance of the choice of metaphors should not be exaggerated.
First, constitutional phenomena are so diverse that no single metaphor can aptly capture them all.
For all its advantages, migration is too amorphous a metaphor for the political scientist who sees Since disagreement about words does not suspend the need to use them, in the rest of this chapter I use the metaphors of borrowing and transplants, interchangeably. When that lens is too limiting, as it will be at times, I switch to the migration lens. The section headings refer to transplants, for consistency purposes. I do not use the migration metaphor as the default in order to emphasize the continuity between the study of interactions in private and public law. The next section turns to this topic.
III. The Missing Legacy of Comparative Law

The Transplants Debate in Comparative Law
Alan Watson argued that, in Western private law, jurist-initiated legal transplants have been 'the most fertile source of development'. 27 Their success is partly explained by the fact that the transplant of legal rules is 'socially easy' so that 'the recipient system does not require any real processes of change must be on the comparativist's agenda.
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The relationship between law and its outside environment or culture is central to the transplants debate in comparative law. One of its most interesting aspects has been how homogeneity-cultural or otherwise-breaks down under the pressures of social differentiation.
The 51 The question of the transplantability of private versus public law rules is related but not identical to the question whether there is a substantive difference between private and public law.
Whatever the answer to the latter question, it remains possible that the rules of contracts or property are different-in a way that affects their transplantability-from norms of administrative or constitutional law.
spirit and soil of a place-and therefore unmovable across space-as rules about political power. 52 Contemporary scholars sometimes make no distinction between private and public and public norms. 53 On what grounds can such a distinction rest?
There is, first, a widespread perception that rules of private law are more technical than constitutional rules. The latter structure and channel political power, whereas private law rules are politically neutral and regulate the interaction among individuals in their private capacity. As
Watson argued, the 'indifference' 54 of political rulers gives jurists leeway to transplant rules of private law that do not affect their office. In this view, constitutional transplants remain possible but they depend on the alignment of the rulers' interests. Their study is highly contextual and varies case by case. It follows that transplanting private law rules is 'socially easy' whereas the transplant of public law rules is less common, albeit not impossible, and, in any event, not easy. 
IV. The Anatomy of Constitutional Transplants
Object
The study of the object of constitutional transplants begins with constitutional text. The smallest unit of transplant can be a rule of constitutional structure-for instance the 'constructive no confidence' procedure borrowed from the German Basic Law into the 1992 amendments to the judicial review, and generally to the overall structure of the separation of powers. 66 The overall structure of implementation can also be part of modularity, broadly understood. In the case of hate speech, the choice between a US-style protection and a system that does not extend such protection is at least partly correlated with the degree to which the enforcement of criminal law is centralized. Centralization affects the possibility of abusive restrictions on speech and thus the level of constitutional protection for speech. Constitutions can flourish and succeed only if they are firmly planted in the cultural soil from which they gain legitimacy. Thus, growing constitutions embodies the not so novel idea that constitutions and laws should reflect and be derived from the cultural norms in which they must endure. Constitutions that are not firmly grounded in the cultural mores of the society in which they operate are destined to fail, become irrelevant, or be shaped and adapted to meet the needs of the culture and society in which they are situated.
Indeed, most postcolonial constitutions in the Sub-Saharan Africa have largely succumbed to irrelevance and debacle. Similarly, Ran Hirschl has explained the worldwide migration of the idea of judicial review of legislation as a mechanism by which disadvantaged elites promote their political selfinterest. Hirschl writes that the current global trend toward judicial empowerment through constitutionalization is part of a broader process whereby self-interested political and economic elites, while they profess support for democracy and sustained development, attempt to insulate policy-making from the vagaries of democratic politics. constitutional models, occurs in situations of repeated borrowing which create 'transplant biases'. As Alan Watson explains it, transplant bias refers to situations when a system's receptivity to a particular outside law, which is distinct from acceptance based on a thorough examination of possible alternatives. Thus, it means for instance a system's readiness to accept Roman law rules because they are Roman law rules, or French rules because they are French rules.
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At first glance, it seems that constitutional borrowings are somewhat insulated from the dangers of transplant biases. To the extent such biases rely on 'habits', 115 their relevance is mitigated by the low frequency of opportunities for constitution-drafting. There are, however, opportunities for repeated borrowing at the interpretative stage.
The formation of transplant bias assumes accessibility, hence a process of socialization in which legal education and legal culture make particular foreign sources intelligible.
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Language plays an essential role, although the spread of English tends to obscure its importance. As we will see, the use of a lingua franca heightens the dangers of nominalism and creates an appearance of constitutional convergence that can be misleading. The contrast between comparative constitutional law and comparative law is particularly stark in this respect, in the sense that language and translation are among the grand topics of comparative law but are 114 Watson (n 26), 327.
115 Wise (n 16), 7:
borrowing from a particular foreign system tends to become a habit: a bias develops in favor of treating that system as the primary quarry for legal rules whenever local law is silent. This 'everyone's doing it' approach to constitutional interpretation requires explanation and justification.
Yet, to date, neither the Court nor the academy has offered a justification that satisfies. Until they do, it seems we are better off to abandon this particular use of foreign and international law. 135 The justification of transplants depends on how one conceptualizes that relationship between law and culture. How, then, is judicial borrowing defended?
In the context of foreign law, functionalism in comparative constitutional law can take the form of crude instrumentalism or more sophisticated pragmatism. 136 While crude instrumentalism has no defenders, as long as the use of foreign law lacks a methodology, judicial borrowing will be criticized as an inherently unprincipled tool that can be used strategically.
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The pragmatist justification reverts to the 'it works' rationale. Constitution, borrowing from US law was done for the purpose of replicating the US success at and sociological factors contribute to the creation of 'a global community of courts'. Slaughter's account is compatible with a dialogical model. 142 According to this model, the use of foreign law is a means by which a constitutional system or culture engages with the outside world. 143 The outcome of such engagement is to better understand the presuppositions of one's own constitutional culture and legal system and, presumably, to change whatever aspects one does not Comparative constitutional law as a field can benefit from engaging with the transplants debate in comparative law, in particular with respect to topics such as convergence and divergence, the relationship between law and culture, and the importance of language and professional culture. Conversely, that debate, and comparative law more generally, can benefit from a study of constitutional borrowings and from the normative finesse that characterizes 152 David Law and Mila Versteeg, 'The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism'
